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RECONSTRUCTING THE BLAINE
AMENDMENTS
FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS*
In the wake of Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, school choice
proponents have turned their attention to state law obstacles, and
in particular to the Blaine Amendments. Named after James G.
Blaine, a xenophobic member of Congress who served in the House
and Senate from 1863 to 1881, the Blaine Amendments are
modeled after a federal constitutional amendment that Blaine
introduced in the House in 1876. This proposed amendment would
have applied the Religion Clauses to the states and prohibited them
from allocating state funds and other resources to "sectarian"
organizations, particularly religious elementary and secondary
schools.2 Although Congress never passed the federal Blaine
Amendment, most of the states enacted similar provisions as part of
their constitutions; thirty-seven of these are still on the books.
*Professor of Law, Brigham Young University Law School;
gedicksf@lawgate.byu.edu. I am grateful to the University of North Carolina
School of Law and The Pew Charitable Trusts for the opportunity to discuss
this issue. I received insightful comments and criticisms from my co-panelists,
and from Chip Lupu and Bill Marshall. I also benefited from participation in
a meeting of the Advisory Council to The Roundtable on Religion and Social
Welfare Policy held on June 19-20, 2003, at which related topics were
discussed, which was also funded by The Pew Charitable Trusts. Finally, I
thank Kristen Kemerer and Kim Pearson for excellent research assistance.
1. 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding school voucher program against
Establishment Clause challenge).
2. 4 CONG. REc. 205 (1875):
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no
money raised by taxation in any State for the support of
public schools, or derived from any public fund therefor,
nor any public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under
the control of any religious sect; nor shall any money so
raised or lands so devoted be divided between religious
sects or denominations.
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
Thus, even though Zelman appears to have removed all federal
Establishment Clause impediments to properly structured tuition
voucher and other school choice programs, the constitutional effect
of the Blaine Amendments remains to be determined.
The validity of the Blaine Amendments under current
constitutional doctrine appears doubtful. Blaine's federal
amendment and the state amendments it inspired were largely
motivated by anti-immigrant and, in particular, anti-Catholic
sentiment. In addition, the amendments by their terms impose
special burdens on religious schools in the distribution of state
funds and other financial aid to education. Both characteristics
generally trigger heightened judicial scrutiny.3
That would seem to resolve questions about the
constitutionality of the Blaine Amendments. Indeed, noting the
discriminatory origin of the amendments, some conservative
commentators have accused political liberals of civil rights
hypocrisy for persisting in their defense.4 These accusations ignore
that the contemporary social meaning of the Blaine Amendments,
as opposed to their meaning in the late nineteenth century, is much
less anti-Catholic than it is separationist. Although they were
originally motivated by anti-Catholic hostility, the Blaine
Amendments were also early manifestations of an ideology of
church-state separation which continues to inform contemporary
Establishment Clause doctrine, and which remains well within the
political and intellectual mainstream!
As a consequence, even if the Blaine Amendments would
not survive constitutional challenge in their present form,
continuing separationist sentiment in many states is likely to
stimulate exploration of alternative constitutional means of
restricting the allocation of state education funds to religious
3. See infra Part I. One version of the amendment may be defensible as a
constitutionally legitimate government funding restriction. See infra note 18.
4. See, e.g., The Next Voucher Battleground, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2002, at
A14 (accusing Blaine Amendment defenders of "invoking a century-old relic
of religious bigotry" that recalls the "poll taxes and grandfather clauses"
employed in the post-Reconstruction South to deny African Americans the
right to vote).
5. See infra Part II.
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schools. Current doctrine would support, for example, a rule which
permits states to condition a religious school's receipt of state funds
on the school's adherence to policies expressed in secular terms,
such as compliance with state anti-discrimination laws, from which
religious organizations are often exempted. Such conditions would
raise questions about the meaning and scope of the "neutrality"
that now appears to be the dominant doctrinal concept in Religion
Clause jurisprudence. I will suggest that neutrality should function
as a shield that protects religious schools from religious
discrimination in the government's distribution of aid and benefits,
but not as a sword that grants to religious schools an entitlement to
obtain government aid and benefits on more favorable terms than
secular schools. Neutrality, in other words, prevents the
government from conditioning the receipt of social welfare benefits
on religious affiliation (or lack thereof), but does not generally
prevent the government from imposing nonreligious conditions on
such receipt, so long as they are secularly defined and generally
6
applicable. I will close with a brief discussion of issues raised by
three likely conditions that states would attach to a religious
school's receipt of government education aid or benefits:
compliance with state anti-discrimination laws, adherence to state
education requirements, and avoidance or adoption of certain kinds
of speech .
I.
The Blaine Amendments are constitutionally suspect under
current doctrine.8 Laws that single out a particular religion for
disadvantageous treatment are invalid under the Establishment
Clause, even when the law employs religiously neutral terms.'
6. See infra Part III.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. For a careful examination of equal protection, free exercise, and illicit
motivation arguments that contend that the Blaine Amendments are
unconstitutional, see Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman's Future:
Vouchers, Sectarian Providers, and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78
NoTRE DAME L. REV. 917 (2003).
9. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246, 247 (1982) (finding
20031
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Moreover, the Court has held that such laws are presumptively
invalid under the Free Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses.0
Accordingly, if "sectarian" in the amendments is read as code for
"Roman Catholic," as history suggests it was so understood in the
nineteenth century," then Blaine Amendments that use this term
are engaging in denominational discrimination in violation of both
statute whose effect was to subject only certain minority religions to fund-
raising registration and reporting requirements to be suspect denominational
preference under the Establishment Clause, which must be "closely fitted" to
furthering a "compelling governmental interest"); see also McDaniel v. Paty,
435 U.S. 618, 639 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating
that the Establishment Clause prohibits government from using religion "as a
basis of classification for the imposition of duties, penalties, privileges or
benefits").
10. With respect to the Free Exercise Clause, see Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993) ("[Legislation]
may not devise mechanisms, overt or disguised, designed to persecute or
oppress a religion or its practices."). With respect to the Equal Protection
Clause, see Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272 (1951) (holding that
denial of Jehovah's Witnesses' application to use a city park because of
government distaste for Witnesses' beliefs violated the "[R]ight to equal
protection of the laws, in the exercise of those freedoms of speech and religion
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments"). See also United States
v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that a
"presumption of constitutionality" should not attach to "statutes directed at
particular religion"); American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89,
92 (1900) (suggesting that tax exemptions drawn on the basis of "color, race,
nativity, religious opinions, political affiliations or other considerations having
no possible connection with the duties of citizens as taxpayers" are "purely
arbitrary, oppressive or capricious" and deny "the equal protection of the laws
to the less favored classes").
11. See, e.g., Richard A. Baer, Jr., The Supreme Court's Discriminatory
Use of the Term "Sectarian", 6 J.L. POL. 449 (1990); see also Jay S. Bybee &
David W. Newton, Of Orphans and Vouchers: Nevada's "Little Blaine
Amendment" and the Future of Religious Participation in Public Programs, 2
NEV. L.J. 551, 551 (2002) (observing that President Grant's references to
"demagogue," "priestcraft," and "religious sect" in his last annual message to
Congress were clearly directed at the growing Roman Catholic influence on
public education).
Four Justices of the Supreme Court recently drew attention to the anti-
Catholic connotations of "sectarian." See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828-
29 (2000) (plurality opinion of Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., & Scalia
& Kennedy, JJ).
[Vol. 2
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Religion Clauses and the Equal Protection Clause."
The analysis of Blaine Amendments that ban aid to
66 13
"religious" rather than "sectarian" schools is somewhat different.
The Supreme Court has typically grouped "religion" with race and
other traits which government is prohibited from using as a basis of
classification under the Equal Protection Clause, 4 though the Court
has never actually held that a nondenominational classification
defined in terms of a generic or general "religion" violates the
Equal Protection Clause. The Free Exercise cases are similar,
having suggested without holding that discrimination on the basis of
12. E.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3 ("No revenue of the state or any political
subdivision or agency thereof shall ever be taken from the public treasury
directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or religious denomination or in
aid of any sectarian institution."); NEV. CONST. art.1, § 10 ("No public funds of
any kind or character whatever, State, County or Municipal, shall be used for
sectarian purposes.").
Of course, it is not a foregone conclusion that a majority of the Court will
read "sectarian" historically. See infra text accompanying notes 27-28.
13. E.g., MASS. CoNsT. AMEND. art. XVIII ("No grant, appropriation or
use of public money or property or loan of credit shall be made or authorized
by the Commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof for the purpose of
founding, maintaining or aiding any infirmary, hospital, institution, primary or
secondary school, or charitable or religious undertaking which is not publicly
owned and under the exclusive control, order and supervision of public
officers or public agents authorized by the Commonwealth or federal
authority or both"); UTAH CONST. art. X, § 9 (1986) ("Neither the state of
Utah nor... its political subdivisions may make any appropriation for the
direct support of any school or educational institution controlled by any
religious organization."); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11 ("No public money or
property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise
or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment.").
14. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); Miller
v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U.S.
648, 651 (1992); Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 186 (1992); McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 n.8 (1987); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 17 (1979);
New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (unanimous decision); Oyler
v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962); see also Toby J. Heytens, Note, School
Choice and State Constitutions, 86 VA. L. REV. 117 (2000) (arguing that the
Blaine Amendments are suspect under the Equal Protection Clause because
they classify on the basis of "religion in general").
15. Heytens, supra note 14, at 142.
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"religion in general" violates the Free Exercise Clause." Even
before Zelman, however, the Supreme Court had repeatedly held
that denominationally neutral prohibitions on tangible aid to
religious organizations and individuals violate the Establishment
Clause.17 Accordingly, it seems that those Blaine Amendments
prohibiting aid to "religious" organizations, as opposed to
"sectarian" ones, are nevertheless equally violative of the Equal
Protection, Establishment, and Free Exercise Clauses. 8
16. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 532 (1993) ("[Tjhe First Amendment forbids an official purpose to
disapprove of a particular religion or of religion in general... [A]t a
minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at
issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs...."); id. at 547
(noting a law created in "animosity to religion" violates the Free Exercise
Clause.).
17. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch.
Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474
U.S. 481 (1986).
18. Restrictions on "religious" schools might also violate the Equal
Protection Clause as covert discrimination against Roman Catholics, since
denominationally neutral Blaine Amendment prohibitions on aid to religious
schools disproportionately impact the extensive Roman Catholic parochial
school system, and were originally motivated by religious hostility towards
Roman Catholics. Cf. Personnel Adm'r. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979);
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
Some questions about the constitutionality of the Blaine Amendments
may be answered by the Supreme Court this term when it returns an opinion
in Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002) (2-1 decision) (invalidating
state law which prohibited otherwise qualified student from using state
scholarship to study theology at denominational college), cert. granted, 123 S.
Ct. 2075 (2003). In particular, the Court is likely to address the argument that
some state restrictions on aid to "religious" organizations can be defended as
constitutionally legitimate funding restrictions. Under this analysis, the fact
that a state chooses to fund the exercise of some constitutionally protected
choices with respect to a subject matter-e.g., the choice of a secular course of
study-does not require that the state fund other such choices-e.g., the
choice of a religious course of study. See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying
text. As the Davey dissenter argued, the fact that a state declines to fund
religious education is not impermissible religious discrimination, but merely a
determination not to subsidize or support activities falling outside the
parameters of the state's educational program. See Davey, 299 F.3d at 764-66
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II.
It is clear to contemporary scholars that the Blaine
Amendments originated in religious bigotry, but this is not how
they were understood by the Protestant majority in the late
nineteenth century. The governing Protestant influence of that
era-an influence that seems obviously religious today-was not
understood as "sectarian," which in the nineteenth century
generally denoted a schismatic or heterodox departure from the
Christian tradition.19 "Protestantism" has never been under the
control of any single denomination, so reading the King James
Bible, reciting Protestant prayers, and performing other Protestant
devotional acts in the public schools were not understood as even20
denominational practices, let alone "sectarian" ones. During the
nineteenth century, a generalized Protestant morality was thought
to be necessary to underwrite the moral consensus necessary for
liberal democracy to function, and one of the principal purposes of
the so-called "common schools" that proliferated during this era
was precisely to instruct children in good democratic citizenship by
teaching this morality.21  Protestantism in public education,
(McKeown, J., dissenting).
19. Nineteenth century usage attached to "sectarian" a sense of division
and dissent from the orthodox Christian tradition. See OXFORD ENGLISH
DICrIoNARY (J. A. Simpson et al. eds., 2d ed. 1989) (quoting, inter alia,
THOMAS CARLYLE, HEROES iii (1841) ("Dante does not come before us as a
large catholic mind; rather as a narrow, and even sectarian mind."); E. MIALL,
NONCONFORMITY I 1A (1841) (referring to a "natural and invariable tendency
[of Christianity] ... to fall into distinct bodies and become sectarian, both in
spirit and in aim"); 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 338 (1877) ("There are
some doctrines in every system that are merely sectarian, adopted by one
particular branch of the church, but not recognized by others as correct
expressions of Christian faith and life.")).
20. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the
Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REv. 279, 298-99 (2001).
21. Joseph P. Viteritti, Choosing Equality: Religious Freedom and
Educational Opportunity Under Constitutional Federalism, 15 YALE L. &
POL'Y. REv. 113, 179-80 (1996); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the
Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1085, 1120-24 (1995). Mark DeWolfe Howe famously labeled these
nineteenth century church-state interactions the "defacto Protestant
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therefore, was not thought to reflect a sectarian or even a
denominational point of view, but was understood as the effect of a
properly organized constitutional republic. Though no nineteenth
century Protestant would have used "neutral" or "objective" to
describe his or her worldview, those terms nevertheless capture the
way in which Protestants of the time understood their beliefs.
Nineteenth century Roman Catholics, by contrast, were
members of a church that remains distinct from the great variety of
Protestant denominations. Protestants of that era viewed Roman
Catholicism as a serious threat to the social and cultural
foundations of the United States. 2 The dramatic rise in Roman
Catholic immigration during the late nineteenth century, together
with the questionable commitment of the nineteenth century popes
to liberal democracy and religious pluralism generally, fueled
Protestant fears that the cultural truths they took for granted would
be subverted in many states and cities by ascendant Roman
Catholic majorities.23
establishment" of religion. MARK DE WOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE
WILDERNESS 11-15, 31, 98 (1965).
22. See, e.g., STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC
EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY 61 (2000) (noting the conflict
between nineteenth century American "principles of individual freedom and
democratic equality" and "the church's authoritarian institutional structure, its
long-standing association with feudal or monarchical governments, its
insistence on close ties between church and state, its endorsement of
censorship, and its rejection of individual rights to freedom of conscience and
worship"); Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 20, at 303 (noting the contrast between
the "overwhelmingly immigrant, urban, and poor" Roman Catholics of the
late nineteenth century, and "Protestant, rural America").
23. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 20, at 299-300, 303; see also Bybee &
Newton, supra note 11, at 555 (noting that the "Vatican Decree of Papal
Infallibility of 1870 added to the anti-Catholic sentiment during this time").
The church's ambiguous attitude towards liberal democracy persisted well into
the twentieth century. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, AntiCatholicism and Modern
Church/State Relations, 33 LoY. CHI. L.J. 121, at 133-34 (2001) (observing that
the during the 1950s the Vatican continued to teach that religious freedom was
"at most a prudential accommodation to the fact of diversity in religious
beliefs," with the moral ideal being "a Catholic confessional state with support
for the Church and at least some restrictions on the educational and
evangelistic activities of other faiths"). The comparably weak commitment of
nineteenth century Mormons to religious pluralism and secular government in
[Vol. 2
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From the distance of more than a century, it is easy to see
the error of the nineteenth century Protestant self-understanding.
The Protestant influence on public education and on government
generally was no more neutral or objective in the nineteenth
century than the secular influence on such education is in the
twenty-first. To put the situation in the most familiar contemporary
terms, the Blaine Amendments are the residue of a late nineteenth
century culture war, one whose structure is strikingly similar to the
cultural conflicts of today. Instead of a Protestant hegemony, we
now have a secular one. Instead of a "sectarian" Catholic challenge
to Protestantism, we have an interdenominational challenge to
secularism, brought by theologically conservative believers across
the theological spectrum." Like nineteenth century Protestants,
contemporary secularists mistakenly understand their secular
worldview as not "a view" at all, but as the correct description of
the world." And like nineteenth century Roman Catholics,
contemporary conservative religions are enjoying vibrant growth
and are not anxious to reassure their secular opponents that their
public intentions are benign.
What would be the relevance of all this for contemporary
Utah may have similarly triggered Protestant suspicion and persecution. See
Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 20, at 303 (observing that a prominent evangelical
preacher and author listed "immigration," "Catholicism," and "Mormonism"
as the three most serious "perils" facing the nineteenth century American
republic); Mary K. Campbell, Mr. Peay's Horses: The Federal Response to
Mormon Polygamy, 1854-1887, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 29, 40-42, 52-56,
62-69 (2001) (showing how the nineteenth century anti-polygamy movement
understood itself to have been founded on the practice's un-American and
antidemocratic character).
24. See JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO
DEFINE AMERICA 42-47 (1991) (arguing that contemporary cultural conflicts
are rooted less in denominational differences than in opposing "orthodox"
and "progressive" systems of moral understanding that transcend
denominational affiliations).
25. I have criticized elsewhere secularism's claims to neutrality and
objectivity. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion,
78 VA. L. REV. 671 (1992); see also Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and
the Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 763, 769 (1993) (arguing
that liberalism is "just a sectarian view on the same level as the religious and
other views it purports to be neutral about and tolerate").
20031
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constitutional doctrine? That one can demonstrate that the Blaine
Amendments originated in anti-Catholic prejudice is hardly
conclusive of their contemporary social meaning. Constitutional
history is replete with laws whose constitutionally problematic
origins have been held irrelevant in contemporary adjudication.
That Sunday Closing Laws, for example, were first enacted to
encourage attendance at Christian worship and to put the force of
law behind Sabbath observance did not prevent the Supreme Court
from upholding such laws on the basis of the much different,
• 2 6
contemporary purpose of encouraging family unity. Anti-
polygamy laws have gone through a similar metamorphosis;
originally enacted to impose Victorian morality and republican
values upon nineteenth century Mormons, they are now justified as
bulwarks against male dominance and protections against spouse
and child abuse.2z
Finally, however the Blaine Amendments might have been
understood in the late nineteenth century, it is doubtful that they
are understood today as anti-Catholic. Perhaps the best evidence
of this is the considerable historical spadework required to bring
the anti-Catholic origins of the amendments to the surface of
contemporary American consciousness. The amendments are more
likely perceived today as simple manifestations of separationism, an
ideology of church state relations which contends that religion
presents unique threats to the liberal democratic order, and thus is
properly the subject of special restraints in defense of that order,
particularly in regard to the distribution of government funds and
benefits.28
26. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Lash, supra note 21,
at 1105-10.
27. See Campbell, supra note 24, at 30 ("Various scholars have argued
that [polygamy] is sexist, antithetical to romantic love, and that it violates the
central tenets of an egalitarian society."); see, e.g., Michael Janofsky, Young
Brides Stir New Outcry on Utah Polygamy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2003, at Al
(reporting Utah law enforcement authorities believe criminalization of "child
bigamy" is necessary because many polygamist societies pressure young girls
into underage marriage and sexual activity).
28. The best exposition of the legal foundations of separationism is Ira C.
Lupu and Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our
Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REv. 37, 50-65 (2002). Judicial statements of
[Vol. 2
RECONSTRUCTING BLAINE
There is historical evidence that at least some supporters of
the federal Blaine Amendment were motivated by separationist
ideology. Professor Hamburger, for example, has detailed how
"theologically liberal, anti-Christian secularists" reacted to the
progressive and evangelical politics of the era by adopting the
"absolute" separation of church and state as a unifying principle. 29
According to Hamburger, these secularists "viewed all Christians
with the same fear and horror Protestants reserved for Catholics,"
and thus "applied separation to all religious groups," thereby
expanding the "popular Protestant version of separation into a
Liberal or secular version that limited all religions with equal
vigor. ' Although these self-described "Liberals" maintained that
the separation principle was already evident in the history and
structure of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, they joined with
anti-Catholic nativists in support of a constitutional amendment
that would expressly place the principle in the Constitution." In so
doing, the Liberals transformed the "separation of church and
state" from a vague synonym of religious liberty, into the now-
familiar separationist principle that seeks affirmatively to limit the
influence of religious institutions on government and American
public life generally."
separationism include Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Board of
Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 250 (1968) (BLACK J., dissenting); and
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). *
29. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 287-
96 (2002).
30. Id. at 302-03.
31. See id. at 296-302. Not surprisingly, the secularists were disappointed
by the tepid amendment proposals (including the federal Blaine Amendment)
of the more numerous anti-Catholic nativists. See id. at 297-98.
32. See Joint Statement by Church-State Scholars on School Vouchers
and the Constitution in SCHOOL VOUCHERS: SETTLED QUESTIONS,
CONTINUING DISPUTES 8-9 (The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life ed.,
Nov. 2002) ("[E]ven those state provisions originally affected by anti-
Catholicism also rest on legitimate rationales for separating church and state
that have the support of people who are not anti-Catholic or anti-religious."),
available at http://pewforum.org/issues/files/VoucherPackage.pdf (last visited
Jan. 14, 2003). Compare HAMBURGER, supra note 29, chs. 12-14 with Berg,
supra note 23, at 163 ("The stricter separationism of [the 1960s and 1970s]
reflected a general distrust of any majority position on matters of religion, not
20031
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III.
Just as the nineteenth century Catholic antipathy to
religious pluralism exaggerated Protestant suspicion of Catholic
political goals, the more recent efforts of religious conservatives to
"re-Christianize" the public schools and the social welfare
bureaucracy feeds the fear of secularists that the ultimate aim is
conservative Christian dominance of government." The original
understanding of the Blaine Amendments as anti-Catholic
measures is not helpful in resolving this cultural conflict. If all of
the Blaine Amendments were struck down tomorrow, separationist
sentiment in many states-indeed, perhaps in most of them-could
easily end in state imposition of secularly defined conditions on the
participation of private schools in voucher and school choice
programs, thereby leaving such programs to confront much the
same constitutional and policy questions in relation to religious
schools as they do now, without the anti-Catholic baggage now
loaded onto the Blaine Amendments. As Professors Lupu and
Tuttle have pointed out, states can comply with both anti-
discrimination laws and their Blaine Amendments by treating
religious and secular private schools alike." Perhaps a better way of
thinking about this issue, then, is not to focus directly on either the
original or the contemporary meaning of the Blaine Amendments,
but rather on the "neutrality" that the Religion Clauses now impose
on government, and by extension on the amendments themselves.
That in the last twenty years neutrality has eclipsed
simply a distrust of Catholicism (which sometimes was, but sometimes was
not, a majority faith.")).
Professor Smith has recently argued that separationism is better
understood as a constitutional tradition, than as the coherent development of
a doctrinal principle or the result of interest-group politics. See Steven D.
Smith, Separation as a Tradition, 18 J.L. & POL. 215 (2002).
33. "Re-Christianization" is a term employed by Gilles Kepel to describe
the relatively recent re-emergence of Roman Catholic and Protestant activity
in government and public life in the United States and western Europe. See
GILLES KEPEL, THE REVENGE OF GOD: THE RESURGENCE OF ISLAM,
CHRISTIANITY, AND JUDAISM IN THE MODERN WORLD 47-97, 196-98, 202-03
(Alan Braley trans., Pennsylvania State University Press 1994).
34. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 8, at 966-67.
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separation as the doctrinal rule for measuring the constitutionality
of distributions of government funds and other tangible benefits is a
significant victory for religious conservatives." For decades, the
Court's general adherence to separationism constituted a
formidable doctrinal obstacle to full participation by religious
organizations in the contemporary American welfare state.-
6
Separation doctrine denied government funds and benefits to
religious groups and individuals who were otherwise fully qualified
to receive them, solely and simply because of their religious
character. 37 Zelman is only the latest in a line of decisions holding
that the religious neutrality imposed on government by the
Establishment Clause generally prohibits the exclusion of otherwise
qualified religious groups and individuals from participating in
31government benefits and programs.
How much protection does Religion Clause neutrality
extend to religion?39 A distinction between "defensive" or negative
35. For an account of this development, see Frederick Mark Gedicks,
Neutrality in Establishment Clause Interpretation: It's Past and Future, in
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN CRISIS: DEBATING NEUTRALITY 191 (Stephen
V. Monsma ed., 2002).
36. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, A Two-Track Theory of the
Establishment Clause, 43 B.C. L. REv. 1071, 1087-90 (2002).
37. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1986); Sch. Dist. Of Grand
Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977);
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Comm. For Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971).
38. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203 (1997); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819 (1995); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993);
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for
the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968);
Everson v. Bd. of Educ. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
39. Although I assume in what follows that neutrality informs the
doctrine of both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, I
have not attempted to elaborate the precise doctrinal dimensions of neutrality
under each Clause. Cf MICHAEL MCCONNELL, ET.AL., RELIGION AND THE
CONsTrruTION 438 (2002) (noting the resemblance of the conflict between
neutrality and separation under the Establishment Clause to arguments over
mandatory accommodations under the Free Exercise Clause).
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rights, on the one hand, and "offensive" or positive rights, on the
other, offers one way to think about this question.0 A negative
right is a right to be free from the effects of government action, to
prevent the government from acting as a restraint on the liberty of
the right-holder. A positive right represents precisely the opposite:
a right to a claim on the government, to compel the government to
act affirmatively for the benefit of the right-holder. It is well
established, for example, that the Press Clause is a "shield" rather
than a "sword"-that is, a negative right rather than a positive one.
The Press Clause protects the right of the press not to be restricted
by government in its news gathering activities any more than the
general public; on the other hand, the Clause does not give the
press a positive right of access to information beyond that afforded
to the general public.
In similar fashion, neutrality can be understood as
protecting only a negative right-the right of religious organizations
and individuals to be free from special restraints on their
participation in the social welfare state. Neutrality need not entail
the positive right of such organizations or individuals to receive
social welfare funds and benefits on some privileged basis peculiar
to them as religious. To say that neutrality protects religious
organizations and individuals from exclusion or other
discrimination on the basis of their religion, however, is not to say
that such groups and individuals are protected from the effects of
40. The classic development of this distinction is ISAIAH BERLIN, Two
Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969).
41. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 665 (1991)
(holding Press Clause does not exempt reporters who violate promise to
maintain confidentiality of a source from common law action by source for
breach of promise); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 565 (1978)
(holding Press Clause does not provide special protection against validly
issued search warrant for negatives, films, and pictures in possession of
newspaper of participants in allegedly illegal demonstration); Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (holding Press Clause does not exempt reporter
who filmed illegal drug transactions for news report from the general
obligation to testify to his knowledge of such transactions when called upon to
do so by grand jury). See generally C. Edwin Baker, Press Rights and
Government Power to Structure the Press, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 819, 839-45
(1980).
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generally applicable secular laws. In this respect, Zelman is
merely the doctrinal reciprocal of Smith, at least as to individuals: if
neutrality prevents the exclusion of otherwise qualified individuals
from a public welfare program, solely because they are religious,
then presumably it also should prevent the exemption of such
individuals from an otherwise applicable secular condition to
participation in the program, solely because they are religious. 3
IV.
In principle, while religious individuals and organizations
cannot be disqualified from receiving state aid on the basis of their
religious beliefs or orientation, it is at least presumptively legitimate
to disqualify them from such receipt if they do not conform to
generally applicable, religiously neutral state policies-that is,
policies framed in secular terms that apply to most organizations
and most individuals, secular and religious. At least three such
conditions are likely candidates for imposition on any school's
participation in state educational voucher and other school choice
programs: compliance with state anti-discrimination laws;
adherence to state curriculum, licensing, and certification
requirements; and avoidance or adoption of certain kinds of speech.
A.
Many states or localities would likely require that private
schools at which vouchers are redeemed comply with state anti-
discrimination laws, both in their admission of students and in their
employment of administrators, teachers, and other employees.
Indeed, avoidance of racial discrimination in both admissions and
42. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 531-32 (1993); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
43. FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE
110-11 (1995).
44. See, e.g., Steven K. Green, Religious Discrimination, Public Funding,
and Constitutional Values, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 18 (2002) (arguing that
Employment Division v. Smith precludes "constitutional entitlement to a
religious accommodation from a generally neutral law like Title VII").
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employment may well be a constitutionally required condition
under the Equal Protection Clause,45 given the Supreme Court's
elastic application of the state action doctrine when racial
46discrimination is involved, and the compelling weight that it places
on the government goal of eliminating racial discrimination in
education.4 7 There would also be popular and judicial support in
some states and localities for requiring that private school
recipients of state educational and localities vouchers comply with
anti-discrimination laws relating to gender and sexual orientation,
even if such conditions were not required by the federal
Constitution. 8
Compliance with anti-discrimination laws presents a variety
of challenges for private religious schools that wish to participate in
voucher and other school choice programs conditioned on such
45. See James G. Dwyer, School Vouchers: Inviting the Public into the
Religious Square, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 963, 994-96 (2001).
46. See, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 38 (1969) (holding city's
amendment of its charter so as to prevent enforcement of existing fair housing
law without popular referendum was state action under section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (holding
popular referendum providing for state constitutional protection of the right
to private discrimination in the sale of property to be state action); Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (finding state action in racial
discrimination by restaurant operating pursuant to a lease of city-owned
building space); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (according state action
to judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenant); see also ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 405-06 (2001) (observing that "[flrom
the late 1940s through the 1960s, the Court expansively defined what
constitutes state action as part of trying to combat racial discrimination," but
also noting the "reduced need to rely on the Constitution to reach private
racial discrimination" since passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
47. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983);
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 465 (1973); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
48. See Dwyer, supra note 45, at 995, 997 (arguing that the same logic
that requires voucher recipients to avoid racial discrimination would also
require them to avoid gender discrimination, and suggesting that if courts
interpret the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit public schools from
"discriminating against gay students or teaching that homosexuals are morally
inferior human beings," they might also be willing to extend these
requirements to private schools as a condition of the latter's accepting
vouchers or other state educational funds).
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compliance. The religious beliefs of the church, synagogue,
mosque, or other religious group that sponsors the school may
mandate certain kinds of discrimination, particularly in hiring the
administrative and teaching staff of the school. Although racist
beliefs about the capacity of African Americans for serving in the
ministry have declined among American religions during the last
half-century, such beliefs have not disappeared. Additionally,
many religions remain committed to theologies that reserve
religious leadership to men, or that condemn same-sex orientation
or activity as a moral disqualification for such leadership. Finally,
even when such discriminatory beliefs do not formally apply to the
general religious membership, they may reinforce or otherwise
contribute to a culture that countenances informal racial, gender,
and sexual orientation discrimination even in circumstances, such as
student admissions, to which discriminatory theological beliefs do
not formally apply.
Aside from theologically mandated discrimination on the
basis of race, gender, or sexual orientation, discrimination on the
basis of religion creates unique problems for both religious
institutions and for constitutional doctrine. Most ideologically
oriented organizations can discriminate with respect to both
leadership and membership in favor of those who share their
beliefs. Pro-environment activist groups, for example, may prefer
environmentalists as leaders and members, the Republican Party
may prefer political conservatives, and, so on. Because
discrimination on the basis of religious affiliation is usually banned
by anti-discrimination laws, however, such laws, when applied to
religious schools, prohibit them from favoring co-religionists in
admissions or employment decisions.49
The inability of a religious school to restrict the majority of
its administrators, teachers, or students to those who adhere to the
school's core beliefs and practices will eventually end in dilution or
loss of the school's denominational or religious identity, just as a
secular group's loss of control over its leadership or membership
would ultimately result in loss of its ideological distinctiveness.
49. See Gedicks, supra note 36, at 1105-06.
50. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of
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Allowing religious schools to discriminate religiously gives to them
the same control over leadership and membership that secular
organizations possess."
Nevertheless, it is difficult to argue that religious groups or
individuals committed to discriminatory theologies are
constitutionally entitled to participate in voucher and other school
choice programs conditioned on compliance with anti-
discrimination laws. The Supreme Court has been most solicitous
of group identity conditioned on compliance with anti-
discrimination laws when anti-discrimination laws apply directly
against groups. At the same time, it has held that government is
generally under no obligation to fund the exercise of all
constitutionally protected choices, even if it chooses to fund the53
exercise of some. It is one thing, in other words, to leave a group
free to discriminate with its own money; it is quite another to leave
it free to discriminate with the government's.4 It is likely, then, that
states may choose to condition participation in voucher and other
school choice programs on compliance with anti-discrimination
laws.
Religious Group Rights, 1989 WIs. L. REv. 99, 106-15.
51. Ira C. Lupu, Why the Congress Was Wrong and the Court Was Right-
Reflections on City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 793, 809
(1998); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 8, at 83-84.
52. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648-59 (2000);
see also Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 329-30
(1987) (upholding exemption from federal employment discrimination laws
that enables religious groups to favor of co-religionists in their secular
nonprofit activities); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871) (declining
to intervene in church schism over theological status and treatment of past
slave holders).
53. E.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (upholding federal
regulations that prohibited institutional recipients of Title X funds from
discussing abortion as a method of family planning, and further required that
abortion services be provided by such recipients in a physically separate
location); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (upholding state medicaid
program that paid for medical expenses of childbirth, but not those associated
with elective abortion).
54. See Green, supra note 44, at 45; cf Maher, 432 U.S. at 475 ("There is
a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected activity
and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative
policy.").
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B.
As to the second likely condition, states will almost certainly
require that schools participating in voucher and other school
choice programs comply with state curriculum, teacher certification,
and other accreditation standards.55 Government has a clear
interest in overseeing the use of its funds to ensure that the funds
are actually being used consistently with the purposes for which
they are granted.56 States fund education and mandate school
attendance to ensure that children residing within their borders
acquire the skills necessary to function in society as informed
citizens and productive adults. 57 On that basis, many states may not
wish to have vouchers redeemed at private schools that refuse to
teach, say, sex education or Darwinian evolution, that employ
nonaccredited teachers, or that otherwise do not comply with
minimum standards for education. Such conditions, like required
compliance with anti-discrimination laws, would probably be
upheld.
C.
This leaves the last likely condition, avoidance or advocacy
of certain ideas. Suppose that a state sought to deny participation
in a voucher or school choice program to schools that endorse or
encourage stereotypical gender roles, or that teach the sinfulness or
evil of those with differing practices or beliefs?" A state might also
55. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 8, at 978; e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 644 (2002) (observing that the voucher program there at
issue required that participating private schools comply with "statewide
educational standards").
56. See, e.g., Rust, 500 U.S. at 194 ("[W]hen the Government
appropriates public funds to establish a program it is entitled to define the
limits of that program"); Dwyer, supra note 45, at 985-86 ("[T]he state must
condition participation in any program of state aid on compliance with such
regulations as are necessary to ensure that recipients in fact further the secular
aim that is the purpose for the aid program.").
57. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986);
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979).
58. E.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. at 644 (observing that the voucher program
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disqualify from participation private schools that reject widely
accepted historical or political truths, such as the political or moral
justifiability of the Civil War, the fact of the Holocaust, or the
superiority of liberal democracy and capitalism over other political
and economic systems. Such conditions would be controversial,
because they constitute viewpoint-based regulation of "pure
speech" protected by the Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
Nevertheless, a state's undeniable interest in ensuring that students
who direct state funds to private schools receive a minimally
adequate education would seem to encompass the power to make
judgments about the factual, historical, or moral correctness of
what such schools actually teach,59 as well as about whether such
schools' ideological viewpoints promote or impede the
development of the citizenship values necessary to a well-
functioning liberal democracy.
60
there at issue required participating private schools to agree not to "advocate
or foster unlawful behavior or teach hatred of any person or group on the
basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion" (quoting Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 3313.976(A)(6))); Dwyer, supra note 45 at 996-97 (arguing that it
would be "constitutionally problematic" for states to subsidize the teaching of
such ideas).
59. See Dwyer, supra note 45, at 997 (arguing that the state need not
tolerate in private schools practices which it has determined, "with a
reasonable degree of certainty," are harmful to children); cf. National
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 584-85 (1998) (approving the
National Endowment for the Art's use of a content-based standard of "artistic
excellence" in determining how to allocate arts funding").
60. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681 (The "'habits and manners of civility'
essential to a democratic society must, of course, include tolerance of
divergent political and religious views, even when the views expressed may be
unpopular." (quoting CHARLES AUSTIN BEARD ET AL., NEW BASIC HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (Doubleday 1968)); MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN
GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 54 (1983) (arguing that children should be socialized to
recognize the desirability of democratic values, including "tolerance, civility,
liberty, equality, respect for individual dignity, participation in political
decisions, freedom of expression, freedom to own and dispose of property,
and respect for minority interests"); Viteritti, supra note 21, at 161 (arguing
that Brown v. Board of Education "perceptively explained the central role
that education plays in a free society-as a source of civic virtue, as a means of
acculturation, as a vehicle for social mobility, and, ultimately, as a guarantor of
full equality"); see also Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 ("[T]he 'fundamental values
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system' disfavor the use
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These kinds of conditions would represent the use of
voucher and other school choice programs indirectly to pressure
private individuals and groups into altering expression that is
protected from direct governmental interference by the Speech
Clause of the First Amendment, if not by the Religion Clauses
themselves. As with anti-discrimination norms, such requirements
would be problematic if applied directly." As conditions to
participation in a government program, however, such
requirements are probably constitutionally permissible, so long as
they are framed in secular terms and apply to all private schools,
rather than being directed solely at religious ones. The Court has
made clear that government is empowered to withhold tax exempt
status from groups whose ethos does not enhance the public
interest that tax exemptions are supposed to promote. 62 It is a small
step from there to hold that states are empowered to withhold
participation in voucher and other school choice programs from
private schools whose animating beliefs and practices undermine
some or all of the values for which the state funds education, even if
such schools formally comply with curriculum, licensing, andS63
certification requirements.
of terms of debate highly offensive or highly threatening to others.") (quoting
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979)).
61. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 587-88 ("[T]he government may allocate
competitive funding according to criteria that would be impermissible were
direct regulation of speech or a criminal penalty at stake."); cf. Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270-71 (1988) ("The question whether
the First Amendment requires a school to tolerate particular student
speech... is different from the question whether the First Amendment
requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student speech.").
62. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586-92 (1983).
63. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 8, at 974-76, 981-82. Rust v. Sullivan
emphasized, however, that the regulations there at issue did not act as "a
general law singling out a disfavored group on the basis of speech content,"
but were simply "a case of the Government refusing to fund activities,
including speech, which are specifically excluded from the scope of the project
funded." 500 U.S. 173, 194-95. By contrast, some of the secularized post-
Blaine conditions that I have discussed appear to single out certain viewpoints
for disqualification, and thus might be vulnerable to this aspect of Rust.
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So long as separation remains an independent Religion
Clause value, political pressure will continue in many states to find
constitutionally permissible ways of restricting the access of
religious organizations and individuals to state education funds.
That the Blaine Amendments are probably unconstitutional as
currently enacted is, therefore, not the end of the constitutional
story, but its beginning.
